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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
fraternal orders. Certainly, the policy arguments against segregation in
schools would weigh more heavily on the Burton scale than the policy
arguments against discrimination in social organizations. Since the IRS
changed its policy regarding tax exemptions for segregated private schools
based on the policy argument articulated in Green v. Kennedy,80 the deter-
mination of the unconstitutionality of those benefits would mean the IRS
would have no choice but to continue its new policy and to eliminate any
benefits that continue to be given to such schools.
The thrust of the McGlotten opinion could also be extended beyond
schools and fraternal orders to any private organization which is allowed
to solicit contributions by use of the deduction incentive. 81 Hospitals,
literary societies, art appreciation leagues, and other charitable organiza-
tions which insist on discriminating in their membership on the basis of
race might no longer be able to enjoy the privilege of soliciting tax-induced
contributions. Perhaps, this would compel, to a limited extent, a more
integrated society. However, as pertinently concluded by the court, this
holding will not "put an end to racial discrimination or significantly dis-
mantle the [more subtle] social and economic barriers, ' 's 2 but government
will no longer be able to support or encourage discrimination in any
manner, even on a social level. 83 Benevolent neutrality toward discrimi-
nation should not be sufficient.
Marc Howard Jaffe
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FREEDOM OF RELIGION - STATE DOES
NOT HAVE INTEREST OF SUFFICIENT MAGNITUDE TO OUTWEIGH
PARENT'S RELIGIOUS BELIEFS IN COMPELLING MEDICAL CARE FOR
MINOR WHEN CHILD'S LIFE Is NOT IN IMMEDIATE DANGER.
In re Green (Pa. 1972)
A petition was filed under the Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Law'
seeking a declaration that a child was neglected within the meaning of
the statute2 as a result of his parent's failure to provide adequate medical
80. See notes 33-39 and accompanying text supra.
81. The holding as to exemptions would not seem to have any significance
beyond fraternal orders and their exclusive passive investment income exemption.
Other exemptions can generally be explained in terms of the definition of income.
82. 338 F. Supp. at 462.
83. It is possible that the Supreme Court could reverse if it finds that the
policy invoked against segregated schools is not so strong when applied to dis-
criminatory fraternal orders. The Court could also find the district court's distinctions
between Walz and this case insufficient to justify reaching different results, and
therefore follow Walz. See note 59 supra.
1. PA. STAT. tit. 11, §§ 243 et seq. (1965).
2. PA. STAT. tit. 11, § 243(5)(c) (1965). See text accompanying note 24infra.
[VOL. 18
1
Cullen: Constitutional Law - Freedom of Religion - State Does Not Have In
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1972
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
care.3 The parent, a Jehovah's Witness, contended that a court order man-
dating the administration of a blood transfusion to her son attendant to
corrective spinal surgery 4 violated her right to the free exercise of
religion. 5 The court of common pleas dismissed the petition,6 but, on
appeal, the superior court reversed and remanded for the appointment of
a guardian, 7 relying on In re Sampson.8 In a 4-3 decision, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania reversed the superior court, holding that the state
interest was not of sufficient magnitude such that it would outweigh the
parent's religious beliefs when, as the court emphasized, the child's life
was not immediately imperiled by his physical condition.9 However, the
court maintained jurisdiction and withheld final disposition pending the
outcome of a hearing to determine the child's views. In re Green, 448
Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972).
The Green case involved two potentially conflicting interests: free
exercise of religion for the individual versus the state's power to require
medical treatment for a minor despite the objection of the recipient or of
the recipient's guardian. The United States Supreme Court had previ-
ously attempted to separate the distinct aspects of freedom to believe and
freedom to act in accordance with belief in Reynolds v. United States.10
There, the Court took the position that religious belief and opinion were
beyond the law, but that the state could legitimately regulate certain
actions which flowed from religious conviction."
Later cases, such as Cantwell v. Connecticut'2 and Barnette v. West
Virginia Board of Education,1 exemplified the Court's concern with
3. For a discussion of the problems of consent to medical care for minors
and of recent legislative efforts to deal with this problem, see Pilpel, Minor's Rights
to Medical Care, 36 ALBANY L. REV. 462 (1972).
4. As a result of two attacks of poliomyelitis, the child suffered from a
curvature of the spine which would deteriorate over time to the point where he
would be totally bedridden. At the time of the decision, he was a "sitter." Spinal
fusion, the recommended surgical treatment, involved taking bone from the pelvis
and transferring it to the spine. In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 340, 292 A.2d 387, 389
(1972)..
5. For a discussion of the Scriptural basis of this belief, see Ford, Refusal
of Blood Transfusions by Jehovah's Witnesses, 10 CATH. LAW. 212 (1964).
6. In re Green, No. 174612 (Juv. Branch C.P. Phila., July 7, 1971).
7. 220 Pa. Super. 191, 286 A.2d 681 (1971).
8. 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Family Ct. 1970).
9. 448 Pa. at 348, 292 A.2d at 392.
10. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). This case dealt with a bigamy prosecution against a
member of the Mormon Church in the Territory of Utah. The. Court alluded to
practices of human sacrifice and self-immolation by a grieving mourner on a funeral
pyre as those which would not be tolerated if the case should arise. Bigamy was
viewed as a threat to the very basis of Western society which the state had a
duty to suppress. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
11. 98 U.S. at 166.
12. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). In a decision concerning Jehovah's Witnesses prose-
lytizing on public streets, the Court noted:
Thus the [First] Amendment embraces two concepts - freedom to believe and
freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second
cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.
Id. at 303-04.
13. 319 U.S. 642 (1943). Justice Jackson spoke of a "clear and present danger,"
the test of Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919), and
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reconciling unhindered belief and potentially regulated practice,'14 but
it was in Prince v. Massachusetts'5 that the Court enunciated a general
policy to be followed in situations where a parent's religiously motivated
practice affected his child's welfare:
The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to
expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the
latter to ill health or death. . . The State has a wide range of
power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting
the child's welfare, and that this includes, to some extent, matters of
conscience and religious conviction. 6
The second aspect of the issue presented by Green centers specifically
on state-compelled medical treatment.' 7 This problem has been examined
by several jurisdictions, and the most frequent distinction made has been
between cases involving adults' and those involving children.' 9 The
power of the state to compel medical treatment has not gone unchallenged,
however. In the case of Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hospital,20
a class action which sought to have the Juvenile Court Law of the State
of Washington declared unconstitutional, 2' a three-judge federal court
considered itself bound by Prince and held the statute constitutional as
applied. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court, also citing Prince,
affirmed in a per curiam opinion. 22
It was against this background that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
stated the question as whether the state could interfere with a parent's
that first amendment freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and worship "are susceptible
of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the
State may lawfully protect." 319 U.S. at 639.
14. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) ; Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 (1942) ; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1924).
15. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
16. Id. at 166-67 (emphasis added).
17. See Comment, Court Ordered Non-Emergency Medical Care for Infants,
18 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 296 (1969); Comment, An Adult's Right to Refuse Blood
Transfusions: A View Through John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston,
47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 571 (1972); Comment, Compulsory Medical Treatment and
Constitutional Guarantees: A Conflict?, 33 U. PiTT. L. REV. 628 (1972).
18. Application of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston,
58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971). Contra, In re Brooks Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205
N.E.2d 435 (1965); Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 1392 (1966).
19. People ex. rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952);
State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962) ; In re Clark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 86,
185 N.E.2d 128 (C.P. 1962); Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 1138 (1953).
20. 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967). Plaintiffs alleged violations of the
first amendment, as made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment, in
that they were deprived of the free exercise of religion, that they were denied life,
liberty, and property without due process of law as guaranteed by the fifth and
fourteenth amendments, that they were denied the right of family privacy protected
by the ninth and fourteenth amendments, and that they were denied equal protection
of the laws of the State of Washington. Id. at 500-01.
21. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 13.04.010(12), 13.04.095 (1962).
22. 390 U.S. 598 (1968).
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religious beliefs in order to enhance the child's well-being, even when
there was no immediate danger to the child's life.23 The majority focused
on the statutory definition of a neglected child. In Pennsylvania, a
"neglected child" is "a child whose parent . . . neglects or refuses to
provide proper or necessary . . .medical or surgical care."12 4 If a child
is found to be neglected, the court is thereby empowered to take such
remedial action as may be deemed necessary.25 The majority indicated
that, absent the first amendment issue, it might agree with the dissenting
justices and consider the matter settled at this point, since the facts
clearly placed Ricky Green within the statutory definition of a "neglected
child." 26 The dissent, in contrast to the majority, placed its emphasis on
the boy's status as a "neglected child" rather than on the combination of
this status with the first amendment rights of the mother.27
Confronted by the United States Supreme Court's per curiam affirm-
ance of Jehovah's Witnesses,2 1 Chief Justice Jones, speaking for the
majority in Green, distinguished that case as one in which the transfusions
given were, in the opinion of medical authorities, necessary to save the
lives of the children.29 Neither the Jehovah's Witnesses nor the Green
opinion dealt with the danger involved in a blood transfusion itself;8°
the Green court did examine the danger of the particular operation, but
only in passing.8 ' Green also avoided consideration of life and death
circumstances and confined its discussion to the "improvement of physical
well being" situation, thereby seeking the narrowest grounds upon which
to rule.
The dissent took issue with the emphasis the majority had placed on
distinguishing life and death cases8 2 and relied instead on references to
the statute 3 under which the petition was brought, as well as on Prince.4
As Justice Eagen pointed out in his dissent, even if, for purposes of
argument, Wisconsin v. Yoder 6 could be read to apply, the emphasis
should be placed on the Yoder guideline that parental power may be
23. 448 Pa. at 345, 292 A.2d at 390.
24. PA. STAT. tit. 11, § 243(5) (c) (1965).
25. "The Court may . . . [c]ommit a child to the care, guidance and control
of some reputable citizen of good moral character .... .. Id. § 250(b). The child
may be committed to a "crippled children's home or orthopaedic hospital or other
institution" for treatment. Id. § 871.
26. 448 Pa. at 341, 292 A.2d at 388.
27. Id. at 350, 292 A.2d at 393.
28. See notes 20-22 and accompanying text supra.
29. 448 Pa. at 345, 292 A.2d at 390.
30. For a concise portrayal of some of these dangers, see TIME, Aug. 17, 1970,
at 43; Oct. 19, 1970, at 57.
31. 448 Pa. at 340, 292 A.2d at 388.
32. Id. at 354, 292 A.2d at 395.
33. The Juvenile Court Law is generally concerned with the health and well-
being of juveniles appearing before the court. PA. STAT. tit. 11, §§ 243 et seq. (1965).
34. 448 Pa. at 353-54, 292 A.2d at 394. Prince spoke of the protection of the
child from ill health, as well as from death. 321 U.S. at 166-67.
35. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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subject to limitation under Prince if the parents' decision will jeopardize
the health or safety of the child.36 The majority, however, read this part
of the Yoder opinion as being permissive, emphasizing only the word
"may." 37 It is significant that the only reference in Yoder to a case
involving forced medical treatment was to Application of Georgetown
College, Inc.3s which was distinguished by the Green majority on two
grounds: first, as a case involving life or death and, secondly, as a case
involving an adult patient.3 9 The Green court interpreted the broad
holding of Yoder as lending support to the mother's position, not to
the Commonwealth's.
40
The dissent declined to follow the Yoder decision, noting that not
only was Yoder not a case where there'was any evidence of physical
harm to the children involved, 41 but also that Yoder's focus was primarily
upon the education of children, not upon their physical health.42 By
exercising control over education in a way inconsistent with the religion
of the parents, a state could greatly influence, if not determine, the child's
religious future. Such potentially overwhelming state influence is not
present where the state only intervenes to insure the health of the child
since the state's interference ceases when the physical condition has
been rectified.
The court discussed only two cases, In re Seiferth4' and In re
Sampson,44 both of which presented a set of facts sufficiently similar to
Green to merit consideration and analysis. Seiferth involved a boy
afflicted with a harelip and a cleft palate. The state sought appointment
of a guardian because the father refused to grant permission for correc-
tive surgery on philosophical grounds.45 Influenced by his father's feel-
36. 448 Pa. at 353-54, 292 A.2d at 394. Yoder spoke of the "harm to the physical
or mental health of the child" as not being present in the particular case. 406 U.S.
at 230 (emphasis supplied).
37. 448 Pa. at 346, 292 A.2d at 390.
38. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964). The Supreme Court also referred to other
cases which involved threats to society rather than involving this medical issue: Jacob-
son v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (compulsory vaccination) ; Wright v. DeWitt
School Dist., 238 Ark. 906, 385 S.W.2d 644 (1965) (compulsory vaccination). 406
U.S. at 230 n.20. See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) (polygamy) ;
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (child labor). 406 U.S. at 239 n.1
(White, J., concurring).
39. 448 Pa. at 346, 292 A.2d at 391.
40. "[T]he State's interest in the education of its children must fall before a
parent's religious beliefs ...." Id. at 346, 292 A.2d at 391.
41. The dissent quoted from Yoder: "This case [Yoder] ... is not one in which
any harm to the physical or mental health of the child ...has been demonstrated
or may be properly inferred." Id. at 353, 292 A.2d at 394 (dissenting opinion)
(emphasis supplied by the court).
42. Id. at 354, 292 A.2d at 394-95.
43. 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820, rev'g 285 App. Div. 221, 137 N.Y.S.2d 35
(1955).
44. 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Family Ct. 1970), aff'd, 37 App. Div. 2d
668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918,
328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972).
45. The father believed in mental healing based on "forces in the universe,"
but did not consider this belief to be religious. He was willing to consent to the
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ings, the boy feared surgery and desired to wait. Since his cooperation
was necessary to obtain favorable results in post-operative therapy, the
trial court ruled the operation should not take place until the boy was
willing. The appellate court reversed,46 but the New York Court of
Appeals reinstated the verdict of the trial court, considering the decision
to be appropriately within the discretion of the trial judge.47
Sampson concerned a youth who suffered from a severe facial
deformity which, although the result of an incurable disease, posed no
immediate threat to his life or general health. 48 His mother, a Jehovah's
Witness, refused permission for a blood transfusion, without which cor-
rective surgery was impossible.49 Greatly influenced by psychological and
developmental factors,5 0 the court found the boy to be neglected and
appointed a guardian to authorize corrective surgery.51 It is significant
to note that the consent of the boy was neither solicited nor considered.
52
The appellate court affirmed with the observation that restricting state
intervention to a life and death situation was too narrow an approach.5s
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed per curiam, adding that
Seiferth turned on how best to exercise a court's discretionary powers,
and that "religious objection to blood transfusion [does not] present a
bar, at least where the transfusion is necessary, to the success of re-
quired surgery." 54
The Pennsylvania Superior Court had noted with approval the
Sampson decision,55 and the Green dissent quoted the superior court
opinion extensively.5 6 However, the majority refused to be guided by
the New York decision in a non-fatal situation, as in the instant case,
and expressed no opinion as to the propriety of Sampson in a life-or-death
operation in a few years if the mental healing failed and if the boy consented.
309 N.Y. at 84, 127 N.E.2d at 822.
46. 285 App. Div. 221, 137 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1955) (3-2 decision). The court
reasoned that the danger to life was not necessary, but danger to the chance for a
normal life was sufficient. The opinion of the child was considered immaterial.
Id. at 225, 137 N.Y.S.2d at 38-39.
47. The trial judge had heard the testimony of both father and son and had
also considered the boy's unwillingness and the need for his cooperation in the
therapy. 309 N.Y. at 85-86, 127 N.E.2d at 823.
48. The disease had not affected either hearing or eyesight at the time the
petition to appoint a guardian was filed. 65 Misc. 2d at 659, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
49. There was considerable risk involved with this type of surgery, and surgery
was impossible without permission to use a blood transfusion. Physicians advised
delay until the boy was older and the volume of blood greater because the risk would
then be lower. Id. at 661, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 645.
50. The fifteen-year-old boy was a virtual illiterate as a result of not having
attended school. He had an inferiority complex and social intercourse was extremely
difficult because of his appearance. Id. at 660, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
51. Id. at 676, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 659.
52. The court was unwilling to put such a decision, which would obviously
affect the rest of the boy's life, on his shoulders and instead assumed itself the
responsibility to decide. Id. at 672, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
53. 37 App. Div. 2d at 669, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
54. 29 N.Y.2d at 901, 278 N.E.2d at 918-19, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
55. 220 Pa. Super. at 196-97, 286 A.2d at 683-84.
56. 448 Pa. at 351-53, 292 A.2d at 393-94.
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situation.5 7 Chief Justice Jones took issue with the word "required" 58
in the New York decision - the court had not defined that term nor had
it provided guidelines for a lower court to apply in its determination as
to whether the surgery is "required." Such a dearth of medical and
philosophical standards greatly influenced the Green court to avoid a
situation where it might be called upon to decide whether surgery would
be "required" in an individual case.59
By failing to express any opinion on "required" surgery, the court
left open the possibility that Pennsylvania may yet recognize a "right to
die" by refusing certain medical treatment. Such a "right to die" does
not necessarily imply what the literal meaning conveys. Rather, it is the
right to refuse to accept certain types of assistance in circumstances where
the result of such refusal will be death. Death is not the end sought, but
only the unfortunate consequence of the previous decision. In the con-
text of Green, why should not an adult or a sufficiently mature minor be
permitted to refuse a life-saving transfusion based upon his religious
beliefs? Such a refusal would not signify that he wished to end his life,
but rather that his conscience forbade him to use this specific means of
saving it. Such freedom of conscience should not depend on the political
power a particular religion may be able to generate or on the popularity
of its adherents. Furthermore, society should not be subjected to a state-
imposed requirement that everyone accept whatever type of medical help
might be available to prolong or save life, no matter how offensive to the
patient. In this vein, one commentator has suggested that elderly and
terminal patients should have the right to refuse treatment which might
prolong "life" but which would be accompanied by increased suffering
or merely result in a vegetable-like existence. 60 Although the majority
has clearly taken Pennsylvania away from Sampson and in a new direc-
tion, it remains to be seen whether the court will accept the full implication
of such a philosophy.
Chief Justice Jones stated the ultimate question as whether a parent's
religious beliefs are paramount to the possibly adverse decision of the
child.6 ' To answer this question, the majority looked to the dissent of
Justice Douglas in Yoder: "Where the child is mature enough to express
potentially conflicting desires, it would be an invasion of the child's right
to permit an imposition without canvassing his views. ' 62
57. Id. at 348, 292 A.2d at 392.
58. Id.
59. "Required" surgery could, if extended to ridiculous extremes, lead to manda-
tory cosmetic surgery to achieve a society in which all appear aesthetically pleasing.
Such a concept of "required" surgery could also result in unacceptable interference with
the integrity of the individual's person in attempts to correct purported physical
defects.
60. See Note, Death With Dignity: A Recommendation For Statutory Change,
22 U. FLA. L. REV. 368 (1970).
61. 448 Pa. at 34849, 292 A.2d at 392.
62. 406 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The majority and concurring
opinions did not reach this point because the parents, not the children, had been
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Recent decisions of United States Supreme Court have extended the
rights of children in diverse areas. 63 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
considered it anomalous in the light of these developments to ignore the
views of Ricky Green in the instant situation since his preference would
have been considered in custody. proceedings, 64 since a waiver of con-
stitutional rights by a person his age would also have been valid, 5 and
since, significantly, minors have been permitted to bring personal injury
actions against parents.66 Therefore, buttressed by its own precedents,
as well as by Yoder, the court, while retaining jurisdiction, remanded the
case to determine the wishes of the boy. 67
The dissent in Green was influenced by the argument advanced by
the dissent in Seiferth6S and was not pursuaded that Ricky Green, totally
dependent on his mother because of his condition, could make a mature
decision regarding consent to a blood transfusion. The conflict facing
the boy in Sampson was similar, and there the court did not submit the
question to the child for his views. Such an approach was regarded by
the dissent in Green as the most appropriate.6 9 The minority feared that
a choice between the wishes and religious beliefs of the mother and a
desire for a normal life, which the boy had not enjoyed and which he
might be forfeiting, would be- framed so as to render the final decision
of the boy virtually meaningless 70 - certainly it would not be the
mature and rational statement which the majority sought as guidance
before making a final decision.
The full impact of this decision cannot be known for some time.
Unlike the unanimous decision in Sampson, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court divided four to three, with the dissent voting to follow the Sampson
position. The holding of the court was narrowly drawn to cover only a
situation where the child's life is not immediately imperiled7l and treat-
ment is contrary to the parent's religious beliefs. The majority appeared
unwilling to commit itself to a clear statement on a life and death situa-'
tion where there is a conflict between treatment and the parents' religious
charged with a criminal violation, and the record indicated no conflict between
the parents and children. Justice Douglas voted to remand to determine the wishes
of the individual children.
63. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) ; Tinker v. Des Moines School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1968) ; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
64. 448 Pa. at 349, 292 A.2d at 392. See Snellgross Adoption Case, 432 Pa.
158, 165, 247 A.2d 596, 600 (1968).
65. Commonwealth v. Moses, 446 Pa. 350, 287 A.2d 131 (1971).
66. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971).
67. 448 Pa. at 350, 292 A.2d at 392-93. The record contains no indication of
the boy's religious beliefs or his feelings regarding the proposed transfusion and
surgery.
68. Id. at 355, 292 A.2d at 395 (dissenting opinion). See 309 N.Y. at 87, 127
N.E.2d at 824 (Fuld, J., dissenting).
69. 448 Pa. at 355, 292 A.2d at 395 (dissenting opinion).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 348, 292 A.2d at 392.
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beliefs. The court also avoided any indication of the position it might
take if the patient were an adult rather than a child. This reluctance to
clarify these issues has the effect of restricting the power of the state
in its efforts to extend "the good life" to all its citizens. As the Pennsyl-
vania Superior Court stated in In re Rinker,7 2 a child can not be declared
neglected merely because his condition could be improved by changing his
parents.73 At the same time, the Green court's decision advanced the power
of the individual to make his own decisions with regard to his life, as well
as with regard to protecting his privacy and freedom of religion.
Emphasis on consulting the child would seem to indicate, at least
with a mature, intelligent child, that the court may expand the freedom
of children to choose their own destinies independent of their parents.
Irrespective of Green's impact on other rights, clearly Pennsylvania
has expanded the right of free-exercise of religion, relying on Yoder,
but whether the Supreme Court intended Yoder to be read that way
awaits further clarification.
On the other hand, the Sampson position, adopted by the dissent,
emphasized that "life" is a concept difficult to define. Sampson stressed
the need for good health if a child is to take full advantage of his oppor-
tunities and to realize his full potential as a human being. Such con-
siderations are not to be taken lightly, especially in recognition of the
ever increasing knowledge of psychological and psychiatric factors in
human development.
Whether the Green decision will affect other jurisdictions is difficult
to predict. The facts, as far as they are pertinent, are almost identical,
yet New York and Pennsylvania have reached opposite results. The
unanimity of the New York court, however, presents a more solid front
than Pennsylvania. Green's refusal to follow the lead of the Sampson
court serves as an indication that Pennsylvania may be attempting to
explore new ground in this area. The strong dissent, however, illustrates
that the entire court is by no means convinced that this tack is correct,
and therefore, any further expansion may not come quickly.
The result of the Green approach is to emphasize not only the free
exercise of the parent's religious belief as opposed to state regulation,
but also the importance of the right of a child to have his views con-
sidered in a situation in which the decision to be made affects his body
or mind. With regard to this last issue, the age of the person involved
is less of a factor in the overall consideration than is his intelligence and
mature understanding. How far down the chronological ladder the court
will go is open to question, but at least the principle has been recognized.
James P. Cullen
72. 180 Pa. Super. 143, 117 A.2d 780 (1955).
73. Id. at 148, 117 A.2d at 783.
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